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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NIX v. WILLIAMS AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
EXCEPTION: CREATION OF A LEGAL SAFETY NET

TOM N. McINNIS*

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a legal system in which during a suppression hearing a prosecutor
argued: “Your Honor, I am sorry to say that our police are so unprofessional
that they did indeed knowingly and purposely violate the defendant’s
constitutional rights. Despite this fact, this same police force is just
professional enough that clearly if the officers had not violated the defendant’s
constitutional rights, members of the force would have found the same
evidence through legal means, so it should be admitted.” In her desire to get
the judge to rule in favor of admitting the evidence, the prosecutor continued
and explained, “Furthermore, your Honor, due to the freezing temperatures that
existed in between the time that the evidence was illegally found and when it
would have been eventually legally found, the evidence would have been in the
same condition when it was legally discovered.” Imagine the prosecutor then,
after having convinced the judge to allow use of the evidence, reversing her
position at trial by arguing and introducing evidence to demonstrate that the
same freezing temperatures would have destroyed, not preserved, the crucial
admitted evidence. The 1984 case of Nix v. Williams1 gave credence to the
scenario that has just been described. In that case, the Supreme Court first
gave its support to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.2
This exception allows the prosecution to make use of evidence that was
illegally gathered when a judge can be convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence at a suppression hearing that the evidence would have been found
through alternative legal means.3

* B.A. 1980 Chadron State College, M.A. 1986 University of Missouri-Columbia, Ph.D. 1989
University of Missouri-Columbia. I would like to thank the editors and staff members of the
Saint Louis University School of Law Public Law Review for their dedicated work in bringing
this article and edition to fruit. Thanks also go out to Jim Hawk for providing insight for most of
my life and Jan, as always, for hanging with me.
1. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
2. Id. at 444.
3. Id.
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Nix v. Williams was the last time the Supreme Court provided any
explanation of the inevitable discovery exception. In the twenty-five years
since Nix was decided, a pattern has developed in which every few years, legal
scholars try to determine whether the inevitable discovery exception should
apply to new factual scenarios. In these articles the authors analyze the Nix
decision, apply its principles and logic to recommend a course of action, and
end with a call for the Supreme Court to provide clarity.4 While these analyses
are well-intentioned and demonstrate a desire to make the application of the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule principled, they lack an
understanding of how the complexity of the Nix case helps to reveal the
underlying reason behind the Court’s adoption of the exception. This is not
surprising because the appellate record of the case fails to adequately
demonstrate the twists and turns of the Williams case.5 A review of the
appellate record of the case makes it seem that Nix v. Williams was a perfect
case for the Court to adopt the inevitable discovery exception. That is because
the case involved a person who all members of the Court thought to be guilty
of a horrendous crime and that no one wanted to see released.6 The facts in the
record also seem to have left no doubt that the evidence in question would

4. See, e.g., Jessica Forbes, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence,
and the Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221 (1987) (arguing for
clarification regarding whether the exception applied to primary evidence); Troy E. Golden, Note,
The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today: The Demands of the Fourth Amendment, Nix, and
Murray, and the Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 97 (1998)
(arguing that for clarification of the primary evidence debate, the warrant requirement debate, and
the active pursuit debate); Stephen E. Hessler, Note, Establishing Inevitability Without Active
Pursuit: Defining the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule, 99 MICH. L. REV. 238 (2000) (arguing for clarification as to whether an active alternative
method of discovery is necessary); R. Bradley Lamberth, Comment, The Inevitable Discovery
Doctrine: Procedural Safeguards to Ensure Inevitability, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 129 (1988)
(arguing for clarification regarding cases where police have bypassed probable cause and warrant
requirements); Jason Liljestrom, Note, Lawful to the World: Protecting the Integrity of the
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 177 (2006) (arguing for clarification of the
lawful means requirement); David A. Stuart, Note, A Sign-Post Without Any Sense of Direction:
The Supreme Court’s Dance Around the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine and the Exclusionary
Rule in Hudson v. Michigan, 27 PACE. L. REV. 503 (2007) (arguing for clarification of
warrantless searches).
5. Robert Williams was twice convicted of first degree murder. The first time the
conviction was overturned due to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). His second conviction was upheld in Nix, 467 U.S. at 437–40.
For a more complete history of the Williams case, see generally THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE
CHRISTIAN BURIAL CASE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE (2001).
6. See infra pp. 281–86.
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have been found legally had it not first been found through a violation of
Williams’s constitutional rights.7
The purpose of this article is to document the crime and trials of Robert
Anthony Williams to illustrate the issues leading to the Court’s adoption of the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. An examination of the
entire Williams case demonstrates that in its exuberance to create an exception
to the exclusionary rule, the Court either misunderstood the complexities of the
case or ignored them. A full examination of the record helps to reveal that the
Court adopted and made use of the inevitable discovery exception as a legal
safety net to insure that individuals like Robert Anthony Williams would not
be released due to the application of the exclusionary rule. Understanding that
the creation of a legal safety net was the ultimate purpose behind the adoption
of the exclusionary rule also helps to explain why the Court has been hesitant
to clarify the parameters of the inevitable discovery exception.
This article is divided into four sections. Section I explains the crime
which Robert Anthony Williams was convicted of committing. Section II
examines the first trial and appeals process. Section III examines Williams’s
second trial and appeals process. Finally, Section IV concludes that, despite
calls for action, the Court is not likely to provide clarification of the inevitable
discovery exception. This is because the Court’s purpose was to create a legal
safety net to insure that criminals who commit heinous crimes do not go free
due to the operation of the exclusionary rule.
I. THE CRIME
On December 24, 1968, the Powers family, consisting of Mr. and Mrs.
Merlin Powers, their fifteen-year-old daughter, Vickie, fourteen-year-old son,
Mark, and ten-year-old daughter, Pamela, went to a wrestling tournament on
the second floor of the Y.M.C.A. building at 101 Locust Street in Des Moines,
Iowa.8 The family was there to cheer on Mark, who was participating in the
tournament.9 While there, Pamela received permission to go wash her hands
before eating a candy bar.10 After five minutes, Mr. and Mrs. Powers checked
on Pamela. When Pamela could not be found in the washroom, they looked
elsewhere. According to Mr. Powers, they “started looking everywhere,

7. No court throughout the trial or appeals process ruled that the evidence would not have
been lawfully discovered had it not been first discovered through a constitutional violation.
8. Nick Lamberto, ‘Y’ Aides Try to Stop Man with Bundle, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 25,
1968, at 1.
9. Transcript of Trial at 24, Iowa v. Williams, No. CR 55805 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County
1977) [hereinafter Trial Transcript].
10. Id. at 25–26.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

400

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII:397

knocking on doors, yelling her name.”11 The family continued its search for
about twenty minutes and then called the police.12
Shortly before 1:30 p.m., while Mr. and Mrs. Powers continued searching
for Pamela, John Knapp, a security officer who worked for the Y.M.C.A.,
observed a resident of the Y.M.C.A. walk into the lobby carrying a blanket
wrapped around something.13 Knapp, who didn’t know that Pamela Powers
was missing, thought that the man was trying to skip out without paying rent,
and asked him what he was carrying.14 The man answered a mannequin.15
Knapp, together with Don Hanna, the physical education director at the
Y.M.C.A., followed the man to the outside door.16 Knapp and Hanna failed to
catch up with the man because Kevin Sanders, a fourteen-year-old boy, opened
the door to let the man leave the Y.M.C.A.17 Sanders also opened the door to a
car that was waiting at the curb. Sanders later told police that when the man
set the bundle in the car the blanket was pulled back and it exposed “skinny
white legs.”18 Williams then drove off.
When police arrived to investigate Pamela’s disappearance, she was
described as being four feet, nine inches tall, weighing sixty-three pounds, with
blonde hair, and blue eyes.19 She had been wearing an orange, striped blouse
and orange slacks.20 As a result of John Knapp’s information, suspicion soon
focused on Robert Anthony Williams, who Knapp identified as the man who
had suspiciously left the Y.M.C.A.21 Williams had been living at the
Y.M.C.A. since October 26, 1968.22 The case was then assigned to Captain
Cleatus Leaming. Leaming was Chief of Detectives and a nineteen-year
veteran of the Des Moines Police Department.23 Leaming instructed the police
to search the entire Y.M.C.A., giving special attention to the room of Robert
Williams, the primary suspect.24 The police were unsuccessful in their attempt
to locate Pamela Powers in the Y.M.C.A. There was no indication that a
struggle had taken place in Williams’s room, but they had removed Williams’s

11. Lamberto, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id.
13. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 135–38.
14. Lamberto, supra note 8, at 3.
15. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 140.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 140–41.
18. Id. at 34.
19. Jerry Knight & James Ney, Search For Suspect At Davenport, DES MOINES REG., Dec.
26, 1968, at 1.
20. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 25
21. Lamberto, supra note 8, at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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clothes and personal property. Detective Leaming reported that it could not be
determined whether Pamela Powers had been taken to Williams’s room.25
On December 24, 1968, an arrest warrant was issued for Robert Williams
on the charge of child stealing.26 On Christmas Day, Williams’s car was found
in Davenport, Iowa.27 Davenport, Iowa is 160 miles east of Des Moines on
Interstate 80.28 That same day at a rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell,
about forty miles east of Des Moines, a maintenance man found in a garbage
can a pair of orange stretch slacks, which were later identified as Pamela’s, a
white bobby sock, a man’s shirt, a pair of men’s trousers with the name
“Anthony” sewn on the inside, a handkerchief, and a Y.M.C.A. blanket.29 The
Iowa Highway Patrol searched along the interstate checking all the rest stops,
culverts, overpasses, bridges and ditches.30 The search of the interstate was
complicated by weather conditions, which included falling snow, blowing
snow, and near-zero temperatures.31 The highway patrol confirmed, “We’re
looking for the girl’s body.”32
As the search for Pamela Powers and Robert Williams continued, police
began to investigate Williams’s background. They learned that Williams, who
was twenty-four years old, was from Kansas City, Missouri, and had at least
fourteen different arrests under a half-dozen aliases.33 His police record
included auto theft, writing bogus checks, molestation, attempted rape, and
statutory rape involving several underage girls.34 Police further discovered that
Williams was an escapee from the Fulton State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri.35
He had been committed to that facility after being declared guilty by reason of
insanity in the rape of two Kansas City, Missouri girls who were ages eight and
six.36 Williams had escaped from the facility in July of 1968.37
Des Moines police also familiarized themselves with Williams’s activities
after arriving in Des Moines.38 They discovered that he was a licensed
minister at the Maple Street Baptist Church, which he had joined in late July.
Rev. G.H. Parrish, who was the ordained minister at the church, licensed
25. Id. at 1.
26. Lamberto, supra note 8, at 3.
27. Appendix at 24, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (No. 74-1263) [hereinafter
Appendix].
28. Id.
29. Knight & Ney, supra note 19.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id. at 1.
33. Id.
34. Knight & Ney, supra note 19, at 1, 7.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Williams as a preacher in August.39 Rev. Parrish explained that Williams
assisted around the church by playing the piano and organ for the junior and
senior choirs, reading devotions during services, shoveling snow, and
preaching three or four times.40
When Williams arrived in Davenport on Christmas Eve, he went to the
home of an old friend, Mrs. Sadie Wakefield Cade, who was unaware of the
manhunt.41 On the morning of December 26, Williams, who was then in Rock
Island, Illinois, called Henry McKnight, a Des Moines attorney.42 Williams
knew McKnight from church related activities and asked McKnight for help.
McKnight replied that he would help if Williams gave himself up.43 McKnight
made one other condition. He told Williams, “You must give me the facts
about the girl when you get here.”44 McKnight advised Williams to return to
Iowa and give himself up. McKnight then called the police department at
Davenport to inform them of Williams’s intention to surrender.45 Williams
arrived at the Davenport Police Station at about 8:40 a.m., December 26,
1968.46
After talking to Williams, McKnight went to the Des Moines Police
Department to discuss William’s transportation back to Des Moines. After his
arrest, Williams called McKnight at the Des Moines Police Department.47
McKnight took the call in the presence of Chief of Police Wendell Nichols and
Detective Cleatus Leaming. During the call, McKnight explained that
Williams would be picked up in Davenport by the Des Moines police and
transported to Des Moines.48 McKnight also stated that during the trip
Williams would not be mistreated or grilled, and that he should make no
statement until he reached Des Moines and they had a chance to consult.49
After surrendering, Williams was booked and given his Miranda
warnings.50 During Williams’s initial appearance, a state court judge notified
him of the charges against him and again gave him his Miranda warnings.51
While at the courtroom, Williams conferred with Thomas Kelly, a Davenport
39. Knight & Ney, supra note 19, at 7.
40. Id.
41. David Eastman, Tells of Visit by Williams in Davenport, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 27,
1968, at 3.
42. Nick Lamberto, Open Charge of Murder Filed Here, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 27, 1968,
at 1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Lamberto, supra note 42, at 8.
48. Appendix, supra note 27, at 38.
49. Id. at 36–38.
50. Id. at 49.
51. Id. at 50.
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attorney, who advised him to say nothing until he had a chance to consult with
McKnight upon return to Des Moines.52
After the discussion between McKnight and the Des Moines police,
Detective Leaming and Detective Arthur Nelson, a fifteen-year police veteran,
drove to Davenport to pick up Williams.53 Around 1:00 p.m. they had a
conversation with Thomas Kelly and Williams. Detective Leaming again gave
Williams his Miranda warnings and explained that the two of them would be
“visiting” on the way back to Des Moines.54
Kelly, acting as Williams’s attorney, conferred privately with Williams.55
Kelly and Leaming then had a discussion, the results of which were a point of
disagreement at trial. The first point of disagreement was that Kelly believed
he had received assurances from Leaming that Williams was not to be
questioned until after he was returned to Des Moines and had the chance to
consult with McKnight.56 Kelly also claimed that he was denied permission to
ride along with Williams and the detectives in the police car to Des Moines.57
The two detectives placed Williams in the backseat of the car and left on the
160-mile trip to Des Moines.58 Williams never expressed a willingness to be
interrogated during the trip. In fact, he told Detective Leaming that he would
talk after they returned to Des Moines and he consulted with McKnight.59
On the way back Leaming engaged Williams in a number of conversations
on topics including religion, Williams’s reputation, his minister, and police
procedures.60 Leaming told Williams that he himself had religious training as
a child and was more likely to pray for Williams than abuse him or strike
him.61 In an effort to obtain statements from Williams concerning the missing
girl, Leaming later testified that he addressed Williams as “Reverend” and
went into what has become known as the “Christian burial speech.”62 The
speech goes as follows:
I want to give you something to think about while we’re traveling down the
road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it’s
raining, it’s sleeting, it’s freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor,
it’s going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of
snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 50–52.
Appendix, supra note 27, at 54–55.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 107–08.
Appendix, supra note 27, at 77.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392 (1977).
Appendix, supra note 27, at 81.
Id. at 80.
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392.
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where this little girl’s body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and
if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since
we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we
could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be
entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from
them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate
it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out
63
after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.

Williams asked Detective Leaming why he believed that they were going to go
past the body.64 In an attempt to induce Williams to divulge the location of the
body Leaming falsely told him that he knew it was somewhere near
Mitchellville.65
While Williams was being arrested, making his initial appearance, and
readied for transport, the police had begun a more intensive search for the body
of Pamela Powers. The focus of the new search was based on the discovery of
Williams’s car in Davenport and the clothing belonging to Williams and the
victim found at the rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell, Iowa.66 The police
had concluded that the body of Pamela Powers would probably be found near
the interstate between Des Moines and Grinnell.67
Thomas Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation was in
charge of the search, which was conducted by about 200 persons.68 The first
step of the search involved obtaining maps of Jasper and Poweshiek Counties,
which are east of Polk County where Des Moines is located. These two
counties are divided in half by Interstate 80, so the decision was made to
search an area from roughly seven miles north of the interstate to seven miles
south of the interstate. The section to be searched was divided into grids with
responsibility for each grid placed on teams containing between four to six
volunteers.69 The searchers were instructed to check all roads and ditches from
the roadbed. When the searchers came upon culverts, they were told to get out
of their vehicle and check the insides. Searchers were also instructed to
examine abandoned farm buildings and any other places where a small child
could be hidden.70 The search began at the eastern border of Poweshiek
County and moved west.71

63. Id. at 392–93.
64. Appendix, supra note 27, at 81.
65. Id.
66. Transcript of Motions to Suppress Evidence at 35, Iowa v. Williams, No. CR 55805
(Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County 1977) [hereinafter Suppression Hearing].
67. Id.
68. Id. at 33–34.
69. Id. at 34.
70. Id. at 35.
71. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 36.
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As Williams and his escorts neared Grinnell, Iowa, Williams asked if the
victim’s shoes had been found.72 Without reminding Williams of his rights,
Detective Leaming told Williams what evidence had been found. Williams
then stated that he would show the detectives where he had hidden the shoes
but, upon stopping at the gas station, no shoes could be located.73 After further
discussion, Williams offered to lead the detectives to a blanket at a rest stop
but, when they stopped, they found out that it had already been discovered.74
As they continued toward Des Moines, there were further discussions
about people, religion, intelligence, and what people thought about Williams.
While they were still some distance east of Mitchellville, Williams told the
detectives that he would show them where the body was located.75 When it
was clear that Williams seemed to be cooperating, the search for Pamela
Powers was called off at 3:00 p.m. on December 26.76 During the period in
which the search was active, it had covered all of Jasper and Poweshiek
Counties, and had made it to the Jasper-Polk County line.77 The search was
never resumed because at about 5:45 p.m., Williams led the police to the body,
which was located in Polk County, two and a half miles west of the Jasper
County line. The location was on a gravel road two miles south of Interstate
80. It took officers five minutes to discover the body once Williams led them
to the site, but they did find it.78 The body was dressed in an orange and white
striped blouse, which is what first attracted the attention of the officers
searching. From the waist down, the body had no clothes. It was partially
covered with snow, with the left leg frozen in midair and the back resting
against a cement culvert.79 One officer on the scene said that due to the recent
snow it would have taken a “long time” to find the body without Williams’s
cooperation.80
Williams then arrived in Des Moines at about 7:30 p.m.81 McKnight, who
was at the station, stated that the Des Moines police “really double-crossed me.
They violated all the gentlemen’s agreements we had.”82 McKnight also said
that, according to Williams, the officers on the trip back kept questioning him

72. Appendix, supra note 27, at 81.
73. Id., at 82–83.
74. Id. at 83–84.
75. Id. at 84.
76. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 36.
77. Id.
78. State v. Williams (Williams II), 285 N.W.2d 248, 261–62 (Iowa 1979).
79. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 22–23.
80. Lamberto, supra note 42, at 8.
81. Id. at 3.
82. Williams ‘Voluntarily Told’ Where Body Was: Police, DES MOINES REG., Dec, 28, 1968,
at 5 [hereinafter Voluntarily Told].
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as to the location of the body until he cooperated.83 Police Chief Nichols,
however, stood up for his officers, stating that, “The two officers who brought
Williams back from Davenport deliberately refrained from asking him for
details of the abduction and slaying.”84
II. THE FIRST TRIAL AND APPEALS
A.

Pretrial Hearing

Prior to trial, a motion was filed on March 25, 1969, to suppress
evidence.85 The motion asked Judge James Denato to “suppress the State’s
evidence offered by all witnesses as to admissions against interest, statements,
demonstrations and confessions made by him [Williams] while in police
custody on an automobile trip from Davenport to Des Moines, Iowa, on
December 26, 1968.”86 The motion also requested that all the State’s evidence
that was linked to those violations be suppressed. This evidence would include
the body and all physical evidence found at the site where the body was
located. The motion argued that the evidence should be suppressed because it
was gathered in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as made
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.87
Judge Denato held a suppression hearing on April 2, 1969.88 In making his
decision, Judge Denato had to decide whether there had been agreement not to
question Williams on the trip from Davenport back to Des Moines between
McKnight and Detective Leaming. He also had to determine if Detective
Leaming had intermittently questioned Williams about the location of the body
on the trip back to Des Moines, which Detective Leaming denied. Finally,
Judge Denato had to determine whether Leaming had denied Kelly permission
to ride with Williams to Des Moines.89
Judge Denato ruled that the trip from Davenport to Des Moines was a
critical stage in the proceedings against Williams which required, if requested,
the presence of counsel in order for the evidence gained to be admissible.90
Judge Denato also ruled that the facts showed that there was an agreement

83. Appendix, supra note 27, at 48.
84. Voluntarily Told, supra note 82, at 1.
85. Appendix, supra note 27, at 1.
86. State v. Williams (Williams I), 182 N.W.2d 396, 398–99 (1970); Appendix, supra note
27, at 1.
87. Appendix, supra note 27, at 2–3.
88. Id. at 1–2.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1.
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between McKnight and the Des Moines police that Williams would not talk to
the police until after he had consulted with McKnight.91 Judge Denato then
ruled that regardless of any agreement, no evidence resulting from the trip
would be suppressed. Judge Denato believed that Williams had been
adequately informed of his rights, understood them and voluntarily gave
information to the police after waiving his right to have an attorney present. In
the words of Judge Denato:
The time element involved on the trip, the general circumstances of it, and
more importantly the absence on the Defendant’s part of any assertion of his
right or desire not to give information absent the presence of his attorney, are
the main foundations for the Court’s conclusion that he voluntarily waived
92
such right.

Although Judge Denato did not decide either of the two remaining factual
questions because they were made irrelevant by the ruling that Williams had
waived his rights, Judge Denato did shed some light on what he believed to be
an accurate reflection of one of the issues by stating, “the Court is not entirely
convinced that Chief of Detectives Leaming testified with complete candor at
this hearing, regarding the ‘agreement’ with Defendant’s attorney.”93 Judge
Denato added that all of his findings were made “beyond a reasonable
doubt.”94 The effect of Judge Denato’s ruling was that it allowed all the
evidence in question to be admissible.
B.

The Trial

The first trial of Robert Williams began on April 30, 1969. In making the
case for the prosecution, assistant Polk County Attorney, Vincent Hanrahan,
used nine witnesses to create an historical storyline to explain the sequence of
events surrounding the disappearance of Pamela Powers.95 Those called to
testify either had direct knowledge of Pamela’s disappearance or Williams’s
flight.96 Because the defense did not dispute the prosecution’s version of these
events, McKnight did not cross-examine the witnesses. Another group of
prosecution witnesses included several of the police officers involved in the
case.97 The most important witness for the State was Detective Cleatus
Leaming. Detective Leaming testified about the long sequence of events
involving him and Williams, which took place on December 26, 1968.98

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1.
Appendix, supra note 27, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Jon Van, ‘Pamela Never . . . Came Back’, DES MOINES REG., May 1, 1969, at 1, 5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Appendix, supra note 27, at 73–97.
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Detective Leaming again repeated the Christian burial speech that he believed
caused Williams to lead him to places where evidence had been disposed and
eventually, the body.99 The final witness called by the State was Dr. Leo Luka,
the Polk County Medical Examiner.100 Dr. Luka testified that the autopsy
revealed that Pamela had been subject to a sexual assault and that she had been
smothered to death.101 This piece of information was crucial to the State’s
ability to prove the elements of first degree murder. The State then rested its
case.
The defense, presented by Henry McKnight, involved the testimony of
three witnesses. It lasted one hour and ten minutes.102 The only witness that
was called to provide exculpatory testimony was Dorothy Brown, a maid at the
Y.M.C.A. She testified that she saw Williams and Arthur Bowers, a Y.M.C.A.
janitor, get on the seventh floor elevator at about 1:45 on the afternoon of
December 24.103 This was a full fifteen minutes to half hour after the
prosecution’s witness had placed Williams as leaving the Y.M.C.A.104 She
also stated that Williams was not carrying a bundle in a blanket.105
The other witnesses were used to illustrate the extent to which Williams’s
rights to counsel and against self-incrimination had been violated on the drive
between Davenport and Des Moines.106 McKnight called Thomas Kelly, the
attorney who had counseled Williams in Davenport. McKnight also called Des
Moines Police Chief Wendell Nichols. Chief Nichols testified that both he and
Detective Leaming were in Leaming’s office with McKnight on December 26
when McKnight received a call from Williams.107
In his closing argument, Vincent Hanrahan said, “All I’m going to talk
about is the first degree because I see nothing else in this case.”108 Hanrahan
explained that this was the only possible verdict because it was first degree
murder when an individual was killed during the act of rape.109 He noted that
according to the testimony of Polk County Medical Examiner, Dr. Leo Luka,

99. Id. at 81. Yale Kamisar has pointed out that this speech is different than the one given at
the suppression hearing in substantial ways. For his analysis of the difference, see Yale Kamisar,
Foreword: Brewer v. Williams—A Hard Look at a Discomforting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209
(1977).
100. Jon Van, Only an Hour of Testimony By Defense in Williams Trial, DES MOINES REG.,
May 6, 1969, at 3.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Van, supra note 100.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. William T. Kong, Williams Case to Polk Jury, DES MOINES TRIB., May 6, 1969, at 1.
109. Id.
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Pamela had been violated.110 Hanrahan reviewed the events, which showed
that Williams was seen carrying a body out of the Y.M.C.A.111 He also
reminded the jury that only the murderer would have known where the body
was located, and that the evidence showed Williams himself had led police to
the body.112
McKnight reminded the jurors that Williams was an escapee from a mental
hospital at the time when the events occurred. McKnight explained that this
might have caused Williams to carry Pamela’s body out of the Y.M.C.A. rather
than report the killing.113 He told the jurors that Williams’s actions did not
prove he committed the murder. McKnight implied that the evidence not
presented at the trial might be as important as that which was presented. In
particular, some witnesses, like Albert Bowers, who had seen Williams the day
of the crime were not called by the prosecution.114 McKnight wondered why
the police questioned Bowers and then let him leave the State without getting
any address where he could be located for the purpose of the trial.115
McKnight also questioned why the prosecutor had failed to mention any of the
laboratory tests that were done on Pamela’s clothing and the items found in the
Grinnell rest stop.116 He also questioned why police had not entered into
evidence hairs that were taken from Williams for the purpose of comparison to
“foreign” hairs that were found on Pamela’s body.117
In the case of Iowa v. Williams, the verdict was announced in open court
on May 6, 1969. The jury did not spend much time deliberating the case.
They began their deliberation at noon. While they deliberated, the jurors
elected Norbert Moreland as their foreman and ordered and ate lunch. It
returned with a verdict at 1:40 p.m.118 The verdict was guilty of first degree
murder.
C. The First Appeals Process
After Williams’s conviction, Henry T. McKnight filed an appeal on behalf
of Williams before the Iowa Supreme Court. In his brief, he argued that
Williams’s conviction should be reversed due to violations of Miranda v.
Arizona119 and because the trial court had erred in overruling his motion to
suppress the evidence resulting from the automobile trip between Davenport
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Kong, supra 108, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jon Van, Faces Life in the Death of Powers Girl, DES MOINES REG., May 7, 1969, at 5.
Id.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and Des Moines while Williams was in police custody.120 On December 15,
1970, the Iowa Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of Iowa v.
Williams.121 The court upheld the conviction of Williams in a 5-4 decision. In
his majority opinion, Justice Larson first pointed out that almost all protections
of the Constitution, including the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination, may be waived by a citizen. After warned of his rights, a
person may waive those rights when he is not in the presence of an attorney.122
The court then indicated that it could determine if there was a waiver by
examining the totality of the circumstances.123 In examining the totality of the
circumstances from the record, the court ruled that Williams had effectively
waived his rights and volunteered statements concerning the whereabouts of
the victim’s body.124
On October 12, 1972, Williams filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, against Lou
Brewer, the warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, where he
was imprisoned.125 The case of Williams v. Brewer was heard by district court
Judge William C. Hanson.126 Judge Hanson ruled that Williams’s statements
were not voluntary,127 that he had not properly waived his Fifth Amendment
rights as required in Miranda,128 and that there was a further violation of Sixth
Amendment rights by interrogating him without his counsel after judicial
proceedings had already began.129 As a result, Judge Hanson ruled that
Williams’s statements should not have been admitted into evidence at trial
where they were prejudicial against Williams.130 The State then appealed to
the Eighth Circuit.131
On December 31, 1974, the Eighth Circuit reached a decision in Williams
v. Brewer.132 The decision was split 2-1.133 In resolving the legal issues Judge
Vogel, speaking for the panel, affirmed the district court’s decision.134 Judge
Vogel ruled that there was no waiver because only after the subtle form of

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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127.
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129.
130.
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133.
134.

Iowa v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 398–99 (Iowa 1971).
Id. at 396.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 405.
Appendix, supra note 27, at 18.
Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
Id. at 185.
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 185.
Appendix, supra note 27, at 21.
Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Id. at 228.
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interrogation, through the Christian burial speech, was the State capable of
eliciting from Williams’s statements after he had asserted his rights.135
On December 15, 1975, the Supreme Court voted to grant the State’s
request for certiorari.136 In its brief, the State, along with twenty-one other
states acting as amici curiae, urged the Court to re-examine and overrule
Miranda v. Arizona.137 On March 23, 1977, the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Brewer v. Williams.138 In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the
district court’s grant of habeas corpus to Williams.139 Justice Potter Stewart
wrote the majority opinion.140 Justice Stewart declared that the central issue
was whether Williams’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel as applied to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been
violated.141 The Court found that Williams’s rights had been violated because
it was clear that judicial proceedings had begun against Williams prior to the
trip from Davenport to Des Moines.142 As a result, Justice Stewart believed
that Massiah v. United States143 was the applicable precedent.144 Williams was
therefore entitled to the assistance of counsel during the trip.145 Justice Stewart
rejected the totality of circumstances standard applied by the Iowa Supreme
Court to demonstrate waiver.146 He stated that Johnson v. Zerbst147 was the
standard to judge if a waiver existed, so the State had to prove “an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” which the State
was unable to establish in Williams’s situation.148
Justice Stewart’s opinion also included a footnote, which is indicative of
the Court’s likely displeasure with the social costs of the application of the
exclusionary rule in this case. In the footnote, Justice Stewart indicated the
Court’s willingness for the State to test the development of a new exception to
the exclusionary rule by stating:
While neither Williams’ incriminating statements themselves nor any
testimony describing his having led the police to the victim’s body can
constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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Id. at 234.
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found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that the body
would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements
not been elicited from Williams. . . . In the event that a retrial is instituted, it
will be for the state courts in the first instance to determine whether particular
149
items of evidence may be admitted.

Through this footnote and an unwillingness to directly discuss which evidence
should have been suppressed due to the violation of Williams’s Sixth
Amendment rights, the Supreme Court put into motion a sequence of events
that would delay the final resolution of the Williams case for seven more years.
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which he explained that
although he generally shared “the view that the per se application of the
exclusionary rule has little to commend it,” he thought it should be applied in
this case because Officer Leaming had purposely violated Williams’s rights.150
Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion, the tone of which was set
by the first few sentences.151 Chief Justice Burger complained that Williams
was undoubtedly guilty of a horrendous crime, and that no member of the
Court suggested he was not.152 The bulk of Chief Justice Burger’s dissent was
then directed at discrediting the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule.153
He argued that rather than automatically exclude evidence, the Court should
have balanced the harm exclusion does to the truth seeking process of a trial
with the imperative to safeguard constitutional rights.154
III. THE SECOND TRIAL AND APPEALS
A.

Pretrial Hearing

Prior to his second trial, again presided over by Judge Denato, Williams’s
attorneys made several motions to suppress evidence. The most important of
the suppression motions was the desire to suppress all of Williams’s statements
during the trip between Davenport and Des Moines, which the Supreme Court
had ruled resulted from a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Included in this motion was a request to suppress all evidence gathered as a
result of the tainted statements, including “articles of clothing, and
149. Id. at 406 n.12.
150. Id. at 414 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 415–16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The result in this case ought to be intolerable in
any society which purports to call itself an organized society. It continues the Court . . . on the
much criticized course of punishing the public for the mistakes and misdeeds of law enforcement
officers, instead of punishing the officer directly, if in fact he is guilty of wrongdoing. It
mechanically and blindly keeps reliable evidence from juries whether the claimed constitutional
violation involves gross police misconduct or honest human error.”).
152. Id. at 416.
153. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 421–29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 426.
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photographs of articles of clothing, found on the body, evidence concerning the
condition of the body, and the results of medical, chemical, or pathological
tests performed on the body.”155 The defense also sought to suppress hair
samples that had been taken from Williams while he was being held at the Polk
County Jail.156
The suppression hearing was held on May 31, 1977, before Judge
Denato.157 Both sides had specific things they were hoping to prove to the
judge’s satisfaction in the hearing. On the first issue, admission of the body
and related evidence, the prosecution had two related goals. They were to
present credible evidence that, despite the constitutional violation, the body of
Pamela Powers would have inevitably been found by lawful means and that the
body would have been in a condition similar to that in which it was actually
found.158 The defense team wanted to demonstrate just the opposite.
The State first marked its exhibit consisting of photographs and maps of
the location where the body was found and two photographs taken of the body
at the time of the discovery.159 These exhibits were introduced to help
demonstrate that if the police search had continued, the body would have been
discovered. The State’s witnesses testified that these photographs
demonstrated the body was not hidden by snow before it was disturbed.160
John Jutte, a special agent for the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation,
was the first witness called by the prosecution.161 Jutte testified that he was
one of the people who had first found Pamela Powers’s body.162 Judge Denato
sought and received a stipulation that the body was found through the actions
of Detective Leaming and Williams.163 Jutte went on and described the bright
clothes that first caught his attention upon locating the body.164 He also
testified that the face was partially exposed and had not been covered by
snow.165
Carroll Dawson, who was in the Des Moines Police Department on the
night that the body was located, was next called.166 He testified that he helped

155. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1168 (8th Cir. 1983).
156. Joint Appendix at 92, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (No. 82-1651) [hereinafter
Joint Appendix].
157. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 3.
158. While there is no precise statement of the State’s intent, it is implied through State
actions. Id. at 1–90.
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 22, 42.
161. Id. at 4.
162. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 4.
163. Id. at 15.
164. Id. at 19.
165. Id. at 19.
166. Id. at 21.
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to remove the body from the crime scene.167 He stated that Pamela was
originally partially covered with snow which was brushed off after a picture
was taken.168 He identified a picture presented by the prosecutor as accurately
showing the body as he initially saw it.169 Upon cross-examination, Officer
Dawson admitted that he did not know whether anyone other than himself may
have cleared snow from the body prior to pictures being taken.170 Hoping to
clarify the situation Judge Denato asked about the snow on the body.171
Officer Dawson told him that he had to brush snow off to be able to completely
see the body, but he did not remember anyone else doing so.172
The State then called Dr. Jack Hatchitt, who in 1968 had been a Des
Moines Police Department Medical Examiner and had helped to carry the body
out of the culvert.173 Dr. Hatchitt testified that when found, the body was
completely frozen.174 His testimony also revealed that at the time the body
was found it was getting dark and snowing.175 The State then introduced two
exhibits, which were climatological charts, which showed the temperatures for
the Des Moines area for the months of December 1968 and January 1969.176
Thomas Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation testified that
he was in charge of the search operation, which began on December 26, 1968.
He explained that a search party composed of around 200 individuals had been
assembled. He said that the search concentrated on Jasper and Poweshiek
Counties because articles of clothing had been found at the Grinnell rest area
on Interstate 80. The search first started in Poweshiek County and moved
westward into Jasper County. Agent Ruxlow explained that the search was
systematic.177 After getting maps of Poweshiek and Jasper Counties, they were
marked off in grid fashion with an area roughly seven miles north and south of
Interstate 80 being searched.178 The volunteers were split into teams of four to
six people and assigned specific grids to be searched. The instructions given to
the volunteers when they began the search at 10:00 a.m. were:
When searching, to check all the roads, the ditches, any culverts; they were
instructed to get down and look into any culverts. If they came upon any
abandoned farm buildings, they were instructed to go onto the property and
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search those abandoned farm buildings or any other places where a small child
179
could be secreted.

Ruxlow told the court that all of the sections of Poweshiek and Jasper
Counties had been searched by the time the body was found. He explained that
Polk County would have been searched in the same grid technique and
estimated that the body would have been located in an additional three to five
hours.180 Agent Ruxlow explained that the search was suspended at 3:00 p.m.
when it was apparent that Williams was taking Detective Leaming to the
body’s location.181 When pressed, he testified that he did not know when the
search would have been resumed had the body not been found.182
The next witness that the State called was Dr. Earl Rose, a physician who
specialized in pathology. Dr. Rose testified that freezing temperatures stopped
decomposition of human bodies by stopping enzymatic actions. When
questioned as to whether three to five hours of additional of freezing
temperatures would affect the decomposition of a body he answered, “No.”
He added that a body kept in continual freezing temperatures would be
preserved for a postmortem autopsy until it thawed.183 He added that
according to temperature charts for the time in question the body would not
have thawed until April of 1969.184
In response to a defense question, Dr. Rose testified that fluid samples
which Dr. Luka had taken from the mouth, rectal, and vaginal areas of the
body, that tested positive for acid phosphatases would also have been
preserved due to the freezing temperatures.185 He noted that the positive acid
phosphatase test was an indication that seminal fluid was present, even if there
was no presence of spermatozoa.186 Dr. Rose also admitted that Dr. Luka’s
original report on the condition of the body indicated that the face had been
disturbed by some sort of animal and that it was not uncommon in rural areas
for a body to be subject to such abuse by animals.187
The defense introduced two items to demonstrate that the body would not
have inevitably been found without a violation of Williams’s rights. Both were
attempts to show that it was getting dark and snowing which made discovery
of the body less likely. The first was a chart giving the time of sunrise and
sunset for Des Moines, Iowa.188 The second was a transcript of the testimony
179.
180.
181.
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184.
185.
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187.
188.
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of Detective Leaming from the first trial relating to the weather conditions at
the time when the body was found and the fact that it still took the police five
minutes to discover the body, even when they had been led to its location.189
Judge Denato moved on to consider the admissibility of hairs which had
been gathered from Williams while he was in custody. The State called
Officer Carroll Dawson of the Des Moines Police Department. He testified
that on December 27, 1968, while Williams was being held at the Polk County
Jail, he requested some hair samples from Williams, who willingly gave
them.190 During cross-examination Officer Dawson admitted that he had
known of Williams’s mental history, but had not informed him of his Miranda
rights prior to requesting the hair samples.191
The defense then called Williams. Williams testified that he feared for
himself when the officers asked him for hair samples and that it would be more
accurate to say that the officers took hair samples from him.192 He went on to
state that he allowed the hairs to be taken because he believed that they had
gotten his attorney’s permission. He said that he could not believe that after
Detective Leaming had already broken one agreement with McKnight that the
police would do anything else to him without consulting his attorney.193
Williams admitted on cross-examination that when the hair samples were taken
the police had not threatened him or promised him anything in return for the
samples.194
Judge Denato ruled on the suppression motions on June 1, 1977.195 Judge
Denato disallowed use of Williams’s statements during the trip between
Davenport and Des Moines, but allowed use of the body and all of the physical
evidence associated with its discovery due to an inevitable discovery exception
to the exclusionary rule. Judge Denato stated that guidance for his decision
was found in the footnote of Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in Brewer v.
Williams.196 He also noted that the burden of proof that the prosecution had to
meet was a preponderance of the evidence.197 Judge Denato’s ruling stated:
The Court concludes that the searchers would have arrived at the site of the
body within a short time of its actual finding, had they continued the search
after dark. The culvert in question was itself uncovered and readily visible and
in getting down to look into it as the searchers were doing the depression on
either side of it would have been obvious—the body was in one of these
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depressions. Had the searchers stopped due to the snow and the dark the next
day was a Friday and a weekend was upcoming—the search would clearly
have been taken up again where it left off, given the extreme circumstances of
this case and the body would have been found in short order. . . . In any case
the frozen body would have stayed frozen and deterioration suspended, into
April according to Dr. Rose. . . . Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
body of Pamela Powers would have been found in any event even had the
incriminating statements not been elicited from the defendant and that
decomposition would not have taken place so as to alter the medical
examination findings of Dr. Luka and thus there held admissible in
198
evidence.

Judge Denato also allowed the samples of body hairs taken from Williams to
be used because Williams had consented, because there had been no
compulsion, and Williams had knowingly waived his constitutional rights.199
Judge Denato then granted a defense request to have Williams tested at Mercy
Hospital to determine if he had the ability to produce sperm.
B.

The Trial

As the date for trial drew closer, both parties to the case continued to
maneuver to advance strategies that would benefit their view of the case at
trial. Since the first trial, new rules governing discovery had been established
by the Iowa Supreme Court. The new rules gave the defense access to all
police files and reports regardless of whether the prosecution would rely on
them at trial.200 As trial grew closer, the defense began a search for alternative
suspects because a police report, made available to them through the
broadened discovery process, showed that the police once theorized that
Williams was sterile. The defense also gained access to a prosecution report
which showed that, according to the autopsy report, there were no spermatozoa
found in the semen taken from the body of Pamela Powers.201
Since a sterility test showed that Williams was not sterile, the defense
believed that someone other than Williams was responsible for the attack on
Pamela. The suspect that the defense had in mind was Albert Bowers, who, it
claimed, had a history of child molestation. Bowers, like Williams, was a
black male who lived in the Y.M.C.A., and was employed there to clean
washrooms at the time of Pamela’s disappearance.202 Defense lawyers
contended that a towel covered with human blood had been found in Bowers’s
198. Id. at 86–88.
199. Id. at 92.
200. David Yepsen, ‘Lost’ Williams Case File Found in Basement Box, DES MOINES REG.,
June 24, 1977, at 5A.
201. Paul Leavitt, Exhume Body, Williams’ Lawyers Ask, DES MOINES REG., June 10, 1977,
at 1A.
202. Id. at 7A.
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room the day after the crime.203 They also claimed that despite requests by
police that he remain in town, Bowers left Des Moines shortly after Williams
was arrested.204 The defense thought that some of the pubic hairs discovered
in the investigation could have come from Bowers. Bowers, however, had
died in 1971.205 Due to these facts, the defense was granted an order to
exhume the body. After the body was exhumed on June 24, 1977, an autopsy
was performed.206 Because the results were positive for spermatozoa the
defense never made mention of Albert Bowers as a possible suspect during the
trial process.207
Prior to trial, the prosecutors informed the court that it could not produce
any of the records of the medical tests that had been conducted on the fluids
taken from Pamela Powers’s body. The court was told that these tests, which
had been stored at Wilden Hospital in Des Moines, were destroyed when the
basement flooded.208 Due to this, the prosecutors motioned for a ruling that the
defense could not make mention at trial that even though acid phosphatase was
found on the body, there was no sign of sperm. The prosecutors argued that
since Dr. Luka, who had performed the autopsy, had not been present when the
fluids were tested, he could not testify as to what particular tests were
performed or the competency of the individual who conducted the tests.209
Judge Denato denied this motion and allowed both sides to work off the record
in regard to the test results.210
On July 7, 1977, the State, represented by lead counsel Robert Blink and
co-counsel Rodney Ryan, began to present its case, which would take two and
a half days, the calling of eighteen witnesses, and the presentment of forty-one
exhibits.211 Robert Blink’s opening statement provided a narrative of the
events involved in the case which the jurors would learn about.212
The defense’s opening statement began by telling the courtroom that
Williams had indeed carried Pamela Powers out of the Y.M.C.A. on December
24, 1968, and disposed of her in a rural area.213 The defense went on to
explain Williams did not, however, kill the girl. Instead, Williams had found

203. Id.
204. Id. at 1A.
205. Id. at 1A, 6A.
206. Paul Leavitt, Surprises in Defense In Williams Trial, DES MOINES REG., July 10, 1977,
at 2A.
207. Brief of the Respondent at 42, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (No. 82-1651)
[hereinafter Brief of the Respondent].
208. Leavitt, supra note 201, at 7A.
209. Id.
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211. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 1–3.
212. Id. at 3–6.
213. Id. at 8.
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the body in his seventh floor room at the Y.M.C.A., panicked and removed it
hoping not to be implicated in the crime.214 The defense said that Williams did
this due to the facts and circumstances which existed in his life at the time, but
did not explain that at the time of the crime Williams was an escapee from a
mental hospital where he had been sent for statutory rape.215 The defense went
on to explain its theory that the crime had been committed by a sterile man,
which excluded Williams as a suspect since he was not sterile.216
At trial the State’s first witnesses, which included Nelda Powers, Merlin
Powers, Kevin Sanders and Donald Hanna, provided the same testimony that
they had at Williams’s first trial. They described Pamela’s disappearance
followed by Williams’s flight.217 The defense did not cross-examine any of
these witnesses.218
The State also brought forward a group of witnesses to demonstrate
Williams’s efforts to dispose of evidence of the crime. Merle Killinger
testified that on December 25, 1968, he found a number of items in the men’s
restroom at the rest stop near Grinnell, Iowa.219 These items, which included a
blanket, a man’s suit jacket, a man’s suit trousers, a man’s yellow shirt, a
man’s light jacket, a man’s handkerchief, a girl’s sweater type blouse, a
Y.M.C.A. towel, a pair of girl’s socks, and a pair of girl’s slacks, were
presented as Exhibits 1 through 10 for the prosecution.220 The last two items
were positively identified as belonging to Pamela Powers. Mr. Killinger then
revealed that he had taken all of the items, bagged them together, and given
them to Officer Gates of the Grinnell Police Department.221
Andrew Newquist, who worked as a special agent for the Iowa Highway
Department in 1968, testified that he had been present when Williams’s car
was searched.222 He identified the State’s Exhibits 19 and 20 as photos of
Williams’s car.223 Officer Newquist then testified about State Exhibits 13
through 17 as items which had been gathered when the car was searched.
These items included a necktie, a pair of slacks, a rear seat floor mat, rear seat
covers, and a rug from the front seat area.224 Officer Newquist identified all of
the items except for the necktie and pair of socks, neither of which carried his
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identification mark.225 Officer Newquist explained that these items were
turned over to Chief Wendell Nichols of the Des Moines Police Department on
December 27, 1968.226
The State then called Thomas Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal
Investigation. Agent Ruxlow testified that on December 26, 1968, he had
observed the body of Pamela Powers where it was found.227 Agent Ruxlow
was then taken through a series of aerial photographs which were marked State
Exhibits 27 through 41. He testified that the photos clearly depicted the roads
which connected the Y.M.C.A. to the location where the body was
discovered.228 The next two witnesses were called to demonstrate a clear chain
of custody for some of the exhibits which were used as evidence.229 To help
demonstrate Williams’s eastern flight, the State next called Mark Cupples.
Cupples testified that on Christmas Eve 1968, Williams stopped at the gas
station he worked at and bought two dollars worth of gas.230
The State called Cornelius McWright, who was an FBI laboratory
technician from Washington, D.C. McWright told the court that the FBI
received a package of evidence from the Des Moines Police Department,
which they tested for the presence of semen.231 After explaining how such
tests were done, he gave the results. McWright stated that both the man’s shirt
and pants, which had been found at the Interstate 80 rest stop, revealed signs of
semen, but no sperm.232 McWright also testified that he had tested several
items for blood typing. These included the man’s shirt and a towel found at
the rest stop on Interstate 80, which both proved to contain type O blood, the
same type as Pamela Powers.233 A child’s undershirt also found at the rest stop
had blood stains, but the type could not be determined.234
During cross-examination, McWright testified that he had tested a sock
and tie, which had been found inside of the glove box of Williams’s car. The
test indicated the presence of traces of sperm.235 McWright was then asked if
the presence of sperm on some of the articles tested, but only semen on others
would indicate that the samples came from different persons. When pressed,
McWright admitted that one conclusion that could be drawn from the lack of
sperm in some semen stains, but not in others, was the possibility that the two
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semen samples came from different sources.236 McWright informed the court
that the bedspread taken from Williams’s room had blood, but not semen or
any other type of biological stains.237
Dr. Leo Luka, who was the Polk County Medical Examiner that performed
the autopsy on the body of Pamela Powers, testified next. Dr. Luka testified
that the external examination of the body showed numerous abrasions and
lacerations on the head, face, and legs.238 The face was cyanotic and it looked
like part of the nose had been chewed off by a small animal. The probable
cause of death given by Dr. Luka was asphyxiation, most likely from being
smothered.239 He also testified that there were signs of sexual abuse at or
shortly after the time of death due to disturbances of the rectum, mouth, and
vagina, but there had been no penetration.240 The rectum was dilated and the
vagina was separated in an unnatural position, but the hymen was intact.241 Dr.
Luka went on to explain that fluid taken from the rectum, vagina, and the
mouth had tested positive for acid phosphatase indicating the presence of
semen, but that no traces of sperm were found.242
On cross-examination, Dr. Luka said he believed that the sexual
molestation had taken place after death.243 He said that there was no sign of
bleeding in either the rectum or vagina.244 He was then asked about the effect
that freezing would have on any sperm which may have been present in the
fluids found on the body. He answered that the lack of sperm could be
explained by the freezing temperatures, which would destroy any sperm that
was present.245 The defense reminded him of a deposition he had given on
June 7, 1977, when he said that under the freezing conditions the body was
subjected to, one would expect to see sperm in seminal fluid.246 Despite this
reminder, Dr. Luka stuck to his statement that freezing could cause the
breakdown of spermatozoa in seminal fluid.247
The final witness was Morris Clark, a special agent of the FBI who in 1969
was the chief of the Microscopic Analysis Unit.248 Agent Clark established his
credentials as an expert in identifying hair samples. Agent Clark testified that
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several pieces of evidence contained hairs that were similar to samples of hair
from both Williams and Pamela Powers.249 On the various pieces of evidence
found at the rest stop on Interstate 80 the tests revealed that there were both
negroid head and pubic hairs, which were all microscopically similar to the
sample hairs provided by Williams.250 Some of the evidence also contained
head hairs similar to those of Pamela.251 Also found attached to the evidence
were “negroid body hairs,” which were not similar to Williams’s; a few white
hairs, the race of which could not be determined; and two pubic hairs, the race
of which could not be determined.252 Agent Clark then went on to discuss his
findings on the evidence gathered from the search of Williams’s car. The rear
floor mat contained a few hairs that matched Pamela Powers; it also contained
a “negroid head hair” which was not like Williams’s and a few caucasian pubic
hairs that did not match any samples.253 The rear seat cover and the left front
floor mat only contained hairs that could be matched with the defendant and
victim.254 The final hairs, which were examined by Agent Clark, had been
taken from the body of Pamela Powers. He said that of the two hairs that were
found, one head and one pubic, both were similar to those of Williams.255
On cross-examination, Agent Clark was pushed to admit that even though
some of the hairs were similar to Williams’s it was only a probability that they
had actually come from him.256 When questioned about the bedspread which
had been taken from Williams’s room at the Y.M.C.A., he testified that he
found two “negroid pubic hairs,” which were not comparable to Williams’s.257
The next information elicited in cross-examination was an indication of the
relative ease by which hairs fall off the human body and are transferred from
one article to another. Agent Clark then admitted that if all of the items found
at the rest stop on Interstate 80 were mingled together in one bag, hairs “very
well could be” be transferred from one item to another.258 Agent Clark also
admitted that this was true for all of the items found in Williams’s car.259 A
final defense line of cross-examination concerned the unidentified hairs that
were found. Agent Clark told the court there were ten hairs that remained
unidentified.260 When asked he stated that he had not examined any of the
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unidentified hairs to determine if they had come from a common source.261 In
a brief redirect examination, Robert Blink elicited a response that it was not
unusual to have hairs from a crime scene that remained unidentified.262
The primary defense strategy during the trial was to deny any greater role
in the crime than the admission of Williams’s disposal of the body of Pamela
Powers. The defense claimed that someone, who was not named at trial, had
killed Pamela Powers and placed her body in Williams’s room in the Y.M.C.A.
The defense argued that upon discovery of the body Williams panicked,
carried the body out of the Y.M.C.A., disposed of it by the road side, finally
realized the gravity of his actions two days later and gave himself up. In
presenting its view of the case, the defense called four witnesses.
To support the defense’s theory, it used part of the prosecution’s theory of
how the crime happened to its advantage. This was because the prosecution
claimed that Pamela had been murdered while she was being sexually
molested. To prove this the prosecution had tests conducted to determine if
spermatozoa could be found on Pamela’s body or on her clothing. These tests
revealed that while acid phosphatases, a component of semen, were found in
the body and the clothes, there were no traces of spermatozoa found. The
defense used this information to put forward the theory that whoever had
attacked Pamela was sterile, which removed Williams from suspicion since he
was not sterile.
The key to the defense’s case then became its claim that a sterile man
committed the crime. To win the case the defense view that freezing preserved,
rather than destroyed sperm cells, would have to be accepted by the jury. One
problem that the defense faced at the beginning of its case was Dr. Luka’s
testimony that the freezing temperatures the body was subject to would have
destroyed any sperm which had been present in the body. This testimony
contradicted the prosecution’s own position at the suppression hearing when it
argued in favor of applying the inevitable discovery exception. At that time
the prosecution argued that the condition of the body was unaffected by the
weather because it was preserved due to the freezing temperatures. The
defense also believed that Dr. Luka had changed his earlier testimony that
freezing would not affect the composition of spermatozoa once he found out
that Williams was not sterile. As a result, at the start of its own case in an
attempt to impeach the testimony of Dr. Luka the defense called Officer Don
Knox of the Des Moines Police Department.
The testimony of Officer Knox was heard without the jury being present in
order to give Judge Denato a chance to rule on its admissibility without the
possibility of tainting the jury’s deliberating process. Officer Knox testified
that in either December 1968 or January 1969, Dr. Luka informed him of the
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autopsy results which were negative for sperm.263 When asked, Knox told the
court that the sterility theory of crime had been his and not Dr. Luka’s.264 He
then examined two defense exhibits which were police memos indicating that
the police were trying to determine if Williams ever had a vasectomy.265 In
reply to a question, he then admitted that the police probably would not have
followed up on their sterility theory if Dr. Luka had told them that freezing
destroyed signs of sperm.266
The prosecution objected to Officer Knox’s testimony on the grounds of
relevancy and Officer Knox’s lack of qualification as an expert witness in the
field of male reproductive systems or cell decomposition.267 The defense
replied that they were not suggesting that Officer Knox was an expert in the
field, but that he could shed light on the veracity of Dr. Luka’s testimony that
freezing destroyed sperm.268 Judge Denato ruled that Officer Knox’s
testimony could not be put before the jury.269 He said that the defense had
interpreted Dr. Luka’s testimony too narrowly because Luka had stated that
freezing was only one possibility to explain the absence of spermatozoa.270
Furthermore, Officer Knox demonstrated that the sterility theory had not
originated with Dr. Luka.271
With the jury seated, the defense called its first witness Dr. Earl Rose, a
pathologist, as an expert witness. Dr. Rose had testified at the suppression
hearing that freezing under the conditions in which the body was found would
not have an effect on any sperm that may have been present.272 Dr. Rose
testified that based on temperatures when the body was being sought, the cold
would have stopped any decomposition of sperm cells.273 He explained that
the time in between the abduction and the discarding of the body would not
have been enough to destroy any sperm cells which may have been present.274
Dr. Rose also testified that it would not be uncommon considering the
conditions under which Pamela Powers had died for the body to empty the
contents of its bladder.275 Dr. Rose next testified that in 1968 it was possible to
do a blood test on semen stains, thus allowing you to know the blood type of
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the individual from whom the semen came.276 The last piece of information
elicited from Dr. Rose was an admission that he had previously testified in this
case as a witness for the State and that his current testimony was unchanged
from his original.277 Upon cross-examination Dr. Rose informed the court that
he had no personal knowledge of the autopsy of Pamela Powers.278
The defense’s second witness was Dr. Dennis Boatman, a urologist who
specialized in the male reproductive system. Dr. Boatman was asked about
Defense Exhibit H, a report on a semen analysis done on Williams.279 He
explained that it showed that Williams was not sterile and was within the
normal range of sperm production with a sperm count of 26 million per cc.280
Dr. Boatman was then asked to comment on various explanations that might
allow an individual who was sterile at one time to later have a normal sperm
count.281 He answered that one would be if they had a vasectomy reversed, but
an examination of Williams revealed that this procedure had not been
performed.282 He explained that seminal fluid only contained two percent
sperm.283 That was true, he told the court, whether it was a man’s first
ejaculation in one day or his tenth.284 Regardless of the number of
ejaculations, one would expect to find two percent sperm in the seminal fluid,
although there would be less seminal fluid with each new ejaculation. You
would, however, expect to find the sperm count still in the millions he
added.285
The defense next called Clarence Yeager, who had been a Davenport
police officer in 1968. He informed the court that he was responsible for
keeping Williams’s car under observation after it was discovered in
Davenport.286 He testified that the car stayed outside in the cold until 5:30
p.m. on December 25, 1968, when the car was seized and the warrant
served.287 It was at that time that the necktie and sock were found in the car.288
When Clarence Yeager was done testifying the defense requested that a
climatological chart for Davenport showing the high temperature on December
25, 1968 as fifteen degrees Fahrenheit and a low of three degrees be stipulated
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to and offered as evidence.289 The request was granted. The defense then
moved to offer its other exhibits into evidence. These included a number of
things from Williams’s room including a bedspread, a pillowcase, and a set of
sheets.290 There was no objection from the prosecution.291 The defense then
received a stipulation that if Jack Sullivan, the chief security officer for
Northwestern Bell Telephone of Des Moines, was called he would testify that
phone records indicated that on December 24, 1968, a Reverend Robert
Anthony at the Des Moines Y.M.C.A. received a call from Mount Pleasant,
Iowa at 12:28 p.m. and that the call lasted until 12:40 p.m.292
The final defense witness was Dr. Garry Peterson, a forensic pathologist.
Dr. Peterson stated that in his position in the Medical Examiner’s Office of
Hennepin County, Minnesota, he reviewed approximately 1,500 sexual assault
cases a year and that he normally testified for law enforcement in such
cases.293 He also told the court that he had experience with detecting sperm in
the bodies of women that had been frozen. He testified that after normal
intercourse sperm was detectable for between twelve to twenty-four hours.294
If a person died after intercourse, the sperm would be detectable for a longer
period of time.295 The reason was that the secretions of the female reproductive
system would cease and the body temperature would lower stopping enzymes
from causing decomposition of the sperm.296 He added, the freezing of a body
at the time of or shortly after death would preserve any sperm indefinitely until
the body was thawed. Dr. Peterson was then asked if a girl died under the
same conditions as Pamela Powers and her body was frozen within the same
time span as hers, whether he believed any sperm present would have been
preserved. He answered that he believed it would.297 After being questioned,
Dr. Peterson told the court that he had reviewed Dr. Luka’s autopsy report and
that he believed that because the hymen was intact even though the lips of the
vulva area had been spread and the lack of any internal or external trauma to
the vaginal area, showed that there had been no attempt to insert a penis into
the vagina.298
The prosecution called one rebuttal witness to try to strengthen its
argument that freezing would destroy rather than preserve any sperm cells
which may have been present on Pamela Powers’s body. The witness was Dr.
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David Culp, a urologist. Dr. Culp was a specialist in the reproductive system
and had done research involving freezing sperm cells for later insemination. In
the most technical testimony of the trial Dr. Culp tried to explain the difference
between slow freezing, such as would have happened to Pamela Powers’s
body, and quick freezing, which takes place at much colder temperatures, and
their effects on sperm. He told the court that slow freezing tends to kill live
sperm cells and may cause them to be destroyed.299 He also testified that
certain diseases such as chicken pox, mononucleosis, and herpes could cause a
man to be temporarily sterile for a period of time. Drug usage could also have
the same effect. He pointed out that continual ejaculations could deplete a man
of enough sperm to make them almost undetectable.300 Dr. Culp could not
provide an answer when asked if one would expect to find signs of sperm
under the conditions in which Pamela Powers met her death and her body was
then discovered.301 Instead, he said there were too many unknown variables to
be able to give a definitive answer.302 Upon cross-examination Dr. Culp
admitted that he had never performed an autopsy in a sexual assault case and
that he had never had the opportunity to observe sperm that was found inside a
dead woman’s body.303
In the closing arguments both sides presented a dramatic appeal as they
conveyed their theories of the crime. Robert Blink, the prosecutor, placed all
blame for the murder of Pamela Powers on Robert Williams.304 After
explaining the law of first degree murder to the jury, he next told them that it
was their duty to determine the facts of the case.305 He then walked them
through what he considered to be the facts of the case. He reviewed the
testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits which were introduced Williams’s
flight, dumping of evidence and surrender.306
Blink then summarized the case against Williams. After telling the jury
that Williams had killed Pamela Powers during an attempted rape, Blink
continued:
The problem then becomes to get rid of the evidence. Now, why, why, if Mr.
Williams did not in fact kill her, did he go to such an extensive means to as
much as possible ensure that he would not be connected with the crime? He
went to those extensive means because he knew that he had to get rid of the
evidence. It pointed at him. And rightfully so, for it is absolutely consistent
with the acts of a man who committed murder and it is no way inconsistent
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with the acts of a man who did not commit murder. Now, we don’t have an
eye witness, Pamela Powers is dead. But I think Pamela Powers speaks to us
in a certain respect. She tells us about what happened. She tells us through the
clothing, through the bloodstained towel, the post-mortem examination. And I
submit to you that the muffled cries of Pamela Powers in Room 724 of the
YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa on Christmas Eve of 1968, which were but a
whimper and whisper at that time are reverberating in these halls. And they
speak to you, and they speak to all of us. And they say that “I was killed, my
life was taken into the adult world, something I didn’t even understand—I
couldn’t comprehend, only to leave it in a violent fashion.” Who took out the
body? He did. Who dumped the body? He did. Who disposed of the
307
clothing? He did. Who ran away? He did. Who killed the girl? He did.

In its closing argument the defense again admitted that Williams had
disposed of the body of Pamela Powers, but denied any involvement in the
murder. Gerald Crawford told the jury that in order to find Mr. Williams
guilty of first degree murder the jury had to answer “yes” to one of two
questions.308 The first question was whether “Anthony Williams wilfully
killed Pamela Powers, with malice aforethought, with deliberation, with
premeditation and with the specific intent to kill.”309 He believed that after
hearing all the evidence the State had failed to demonstrate this. Therefore, a
guilty verdict was dependant on a second question. That being whether
Anthony Williams killed Pamela Powers in attempting or perpetrating a sexual
assault. Gerald Crawford then told the jury, “The evidence is clear. Pamela
Powers, at the time of her death or shortly thereafter, was sexually assaulted by
a sterile male.”310 He added that the killing and molestation happened before
Pamela’s body was ever removed from the Y.M.C.A.311 He noted that all of
the facts of the prosecution’s case were consistent with this conclusion.312
Crawford raised questions about whether Williams had enough time to
commit the murder. He told the jury:
The evidence also shows that from 12:28 until 12:40 Mr. Williams was on the
telephone and you have that evidence before you. They have seen him leaving
at 1 o’clock. He was on the telephone until 12:40 and ask yourself, in 20
minutes does a man go from the 7th floor of the YMCA downstairs, spot a
little girl and abduct her, go back upstairs with her to Room 724, suffocate her
and sexually assault her three times, put a bundle together around her, put

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id. at 349.
Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 349.
Id. at 374.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

NIX v. WILLIAMS AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION

429

some clothes on top of the bundle and carry the bundle downstairs to the main
313
floor and out the lobby in 20 minutes?

Crawford then attacked the prosecution’s case calling everything beyond
what the defense itself stipulated as a fact to be circumstantial.314 He went on
to explain the weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. He first pointed out the
difficulties in believing the prosecution’s position that the freezing of the body
would have destroyed any signs of sperm cells that may have been present in
the seminal fluid taken off the body. In doing so, he noted out that Williams’s
car was also subject to freezing temperatures before it was seized and searched.
He went on to say that the socks and necktie which were found in the car were
not tested by the FBI for signs of sperm until almost an additional month had
gone by.315 He found it curious that despite the freezing temperatures and
delay in time, those sperm cells had not been destroyed.316 He also found it
odd, in light of the testimony that no urine stain had been found on Williams’s
sheets if the crime had taken place in his room as the prosecution contended.317
He told the jury to consider if a struggle had taken place in Williams’s room,
why was there not at least a partial fingerprint of Pamela Powers’s to be
found.318 All indications were that she had been attacked somewhere else and
placed in Williams’s room after she was dead.319 He next attacked the
prosecution’s hair evidence reminding the jury that all of the items found at the
rest stop had been placed in a common bag and that some of Williams’s hairs
may have easily been transferred from his articles to hers.320 He said what he
found informative was that a total of twelve hairs were of unknown origin
including two pubic hairs that were found on the little girl’s slacks. He also
expressed disappointment that the prosecution had not thought to compare
these unidentified hairs to see if they could have come from the same
person.321
Gerald Crawford explained that he believed that the crime was committed
by a sterile man and that they had presented adequate evidence to show that
Williams was not sterile.322 The jurors were told they would have to sort
through the testimony given by all of the doctors as to the effects that freezing
would have upon the decomposition of sperm cells. To help them with this
process, he went over the inconsistencies in Dr. Luka’s testimony reading from
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the depositions in which he had gone on record to say that freezing would
preserve sperm cells and comparing that to his comments at trial that it would
destroy them.323 He told the jurors to use their own common sense as to what
effect freezing has in the preservation of something.324 He reminded the jurors
that the State’s other witness on the matter, Dr. Culp, worked with living
sperm in the area of artificial insemination and had never examined a dead
female for traces of sperm.325 Next, he drew the jurors’s attention to Dr. Rose
who had testified that freezing would preserve any sperm present. He pointed
out that Dr. Rose had entered the case as a witness for the prosecution, but was
uncalled by the State when it was realized that Williams was not sterile and his
testimony was no longer helpful.326 He also reminded the jurors that Dr. Rose
had told the court that you could distinguish a person’s blood type from a
sample of seminal fluid. He stated that if such a test had been done it could
have conclusively shown that the seminal fluid had not come from Williams,
but the State had failed to conduct such a test.327 Finally, he reminded the
jurors that Dr. Peterson, who was a specialist in sexual assaults, also testified
that freezing would preserve, not destroy, any sperm which had been
present.328 Due to all of the problems which existed in the State’s case, Gerald
Crawford suggested that there was enough doubt for Williams to be found not
guilty.329
Roger Owens then took over the defense’s closing argument. He explained
to the jurors that other than the defense’s own admission that Williams had
disposed of the body, the prosecution’s case was based upon circumstantial
evidence.330 He said that in a circumstantial case such as this, all of the
evidence must be consistent in order for the jury to convict. It was not
consistent in this case because Williams was not sterile.331 He told the jurors
that they had taken an oath to uphold the law. Then he threw a law book
twenty feet across the courtroom.332 He then said that the book was worthless
when the laws were not upheld.333 He ended the closing arguments stating
“And by God, now, everyone at this table wants you to uphold that law. Not
just [defense counsel] Mr. Crawford, Mr. Wellman and Mr. Williams, but
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[prosecutors] Mr. Blink and Mr. Ryan also, and so do I. . . . I think you will
find Mr. Williams not guilty.”334
The prosecution was then given the last word in the trial. Robert Blink
said the defense theory that Williams could not have committed the crime
since he was not sterile was much ado about nothing. He said that all of the
expert witnesses were dealing in theories and that their conclusions were
influenced by a wide variety of variables.335 The variable that could not be
explained away was that the semen on the body and the pants found at the rest
stop on Interstate 80 were similar.336 For dramatic effect Blink then wrote the
word “body” on the courtroom chalk board followed by the word “pants.” He
then emphasized the point by holding up a pair of pants with the name
“Anthony” on them and saying what was on the girl was on these pants.337
Blink told the jury that the link between the pants and the semen could not be
denied and that this perhaps more than any other piece of evidence haunted
Williams.338
He warned the jury about falling into the situation which the defense
desired. That being, speculating about what may have happened rather than
concentrating on what the evidence actually showed. Blink explained, “I think
they want you to speculate. I think they want you to guess. I think they want
you to imagine.”339 An example, he believed, was the defenses attempt to
make a big deal out of the lack of a urine stain on the sheets from Williams’s
room. Blink told the jurors that rather than speculating on why, they should
remember that Pamela had originally shown up missing when she left to go to
the wash room which provides its own explanation.340 Robert Blink ended his
summation by asking for the jury to bring in a verdict of guilty and added, “It
is your common sense that must lead to your conclusions.”341
After receiving its instructions, the jury retired for its deliberations at 9:17
a.m. on July 13, 1977.342 Jury deliberations went much slower than in the first
trial where the jury both ate lunch and convicted Williams in only 100
minutes.343 Deliberations continued for seven hours until the jury quit for the

334. Id. at 389–90.
335. Id. at 391.
336. Leavitt, supra note 332.
337. Id.
338. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 394–95.
339. Id. at 398.
340. Id. at 400.
341. Id. at 401.
342. Paul Leavitt, Williams Jury Deliberates; No Verdict Yet, DES MOINES REG., July 14,
1977, at 3A.
343. Van, supra note 117.
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day.344 On July 14, 1977, the second day of jury deliberations, the jury
requested the testimony of two witnesses, Dr. Luka and Dr. Peterson, to be
read back to them.345 The attorneys were informed of the request. In a
meeting in Judge Denato’s chambers, Robert Blink objected to allowing the
testimony to be read. He argued that it unduly emphasized particular evidence
and might possibly cause the jury to ignore the body of other evidence in the
case which would not be in the best interest of the State.346 The defense
counsel indicated that they had discussed the request with Williams and that
they had no objections.347 Judge Denato decided to allow the request.348
It is interesting that the indication from the jury deliberations was that the
verdict in the case may have hinged upon whether freezing temperatures would
have impacted the condition of the evidence. This is ironic, because in the
suppression hearing involving the inevitable discovery of the body, both
parties to the case had made arguments in favor of the opposite conclusions
they sought at trial. At that hearing, the State which sought admission of the
body and related evidence argued that even if it would have been found at a
later point in time it would have been in the same condition due to the freezing
temperatures.349 The defense, on the other hand, had argued that the body
would not have been in the same condition if discovered later, and therefore,
should not be allowed as evidence. The argument which the State had made at
the suppression hearing, but which it repudiated at trial, had been central to
Judge Denato’s ruling that the body would have been inevitably discovered in
the same condition.
On July 15, 1977, at 10:02 a.m. the jury, after deliberating for thirteen and
one-half hours, returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder against
Robert Williams.350 The jurors had taken six or seven ballots by late in the
afternoon of July 14 and believed at that point that they were close to an
agreement and considered coming back at 7:00 p.m. to try to reach a decision.
Instead, they decided to take the night off in order to think over their positions.
When they returned on the morning of July 15 they were able to reach a
consensus.351 The jurors who spoke said that there was no animosity between
the jurors over the verdict and one said that they were “glad it’s over” since

344. See Leavitt, supra note 342; Paul Leavitt, Williams Found Guilty in Retrial; Plans
Appeal, DES MOINES REG., July 16, 1977, at 1A [hereinafter Williams Found Guilty].
345. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 402–03.
346. Id. at 403.
347. Id. at 403–04.
348. Id. at 404.
349. See supra text accompanying 157–99.
350. Williams Found Guilty, supra note 344, at 6A. See also Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at
404.
351. Williams Found Guilty, supra note 344, at 6A.
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they “just want to forget about it.”352 The jurors did not explain what facts
were most influential in reaching their verdict.
C. The Second Appeals Process
After his conviction Williams first pursued an appeal before the Iowa
Supreme Court. In State v. Williams,353 Williams’s attorneys argued that there
were a variety of reasons why the conviction should be overturned, but the one
with the most traction was that there was no inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule. The court unanimously ruled that the inevitable
discovery exception was a constitutionally sound exception to the exclusionary
rule. It explained that under the exception:
After the defendant has shown unlawful conduct on the part of the police, the
State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the
police did not act in bad faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of the
evidence in question, and (2) that the evidence in question would have been
354
discovered by lawful means.

After accepting the inevitable discovery exception, the court applied its
rule to the particular facts of the case and found that the conditions imposed on
the State to have been met.355 In its reasoning to support inevitable discovery
the court relied on the prosecution’s arguments from the suppression hearing
that, due to the freezing temperatures, the body would have remained
preserved, despite the fact that the State had argued the opposite at trial.
Williams next pursued habeas relief in Williams v. Nix.356 The habeas
corpus proceeding was presided over by Judge Vietor. Judge Vietor reviewed
the evidence by studying the record and held an evidentiary hearing on August
2, 1981, where most of the arguments and evidence presented were repetitious
of those made before the Iowa Supreme Court. There were, however, several
new pieces of evidence which were considered by Judge Vietor.357 Despite the

352. Id.
353. State v. Williams (Williams II), 285 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1979).
354. Id. at 260.
355. Id. at 262.
356. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
357. The evidence included newly discovered photos of Pamela’s body with more snow
covering it than had been available at trial, photos which demonstrated that the culvert where the
body was hidden was not discernible from the road, Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation
reports that showed that there had been no discussion of extending the search party into Polk
County, a deposition from Thomas Ruxlow that he knew the purpose of the suppression hearing
when he testified and that the picture he identified of Pamela at it was taken only after snow had
been brushed off the body, and a deposition from Richard Boucher, who had been a resident of
the Y.M.C.A. on the day of the crime. Boucher testified that at about the same time as the crime,
he had heard suspicious and belligerent noises coming from the room next to his and identified
the voice as Albert Bowers, a Y.M.C.A. custodian. He then saw Bowers taking suitcases into his
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new evidence and all the arguments made in the briefs and at oral argument,
Judge Vietor’s resolution of the issues closely followed the same line of
argument as that of the Iowa Supreme Court. As a result, he ruled that there
were no errors made by the trial court.358
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Williams was more successful.359 The
Eighth Circuit decided that it was not necessary to determine whether the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule could withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Instead, it assumed arguendo that the exception did
exist and that the Iowa Supreme Court had correctly established the rules for
its application.360 Based upon all the available information, the Eighth Circuit
then ruled that the police had not acted in good faith when they violated
Williams’s right to counsel so the inevitable discovery exception as formulated
by the Iowa Supreme Court could not be applied to Williams’s case.361 As a
result, Pamela Powers’s body and all the evidence gained at the scene should
not have been admitted at trial.
Iowa sought review in the Supreme Court. According to the Court it:
granted certiorari to consider whether, at respondent Williams’s second murder
trial in state court, evidence pertaining to the discovery and condition of the
victim’s body was properly admitted on the ground that it would ultimately or
inevitably have been discovered even if no violation of any constitutional or
362
statutory provision had taken place.

Iowa’s brief drew distinctions between the different types of factual
scenarios in which the inevitable discovery exception could be applied.363 The
first of these scenarios was referred to as “independent inevitable
discovery.”364 Iowa argued the Williams case represented an example of
“independent inevitable discovery.” In this scenario, which Iowa argued as the
strongest case for use of the inevitable discovery exception, law enforcement
officials are aggressively pursuing lawful means of discovering the evidence
while simultaneously finding it through illegal conduct. In effect, both

room and heard him packing. At the time Boucher informed the police about his concerns he and
a police officer then went to Bowers’s room and asked him not to leave. He replied that he was
not going anywhere. Shortly afterwards, however, Bowers left the building. Boucher also said
that he then found a towel in Bowers’s room which looked like it had bloodstains. Brief of the
Respondent, supra note 207, at 42 n.33.
358. Nix, 528 F. Supp. at 675.
359. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983).
360. Id. at 1169.
361. Id. at 1166.
362. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 434 (1984).
363. For an extended discussion of Iowa’s position by its primary author, see Brent R. Appel,
The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 101 (1985).
364. Brief of the Petitioner at 11, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (No. 82-1651)
[hereinafter Brief of the Petitioner].
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methods would have been successful so the police should not be penalized for
the illegal method when the legal method would have accomplished the same
thing at a later point in time.365 In these cases, the inevitable discovery
exception really represented a variation of the well-accepted independent
source rule.366
Iowa argued that while application of the inevitable discovery exception
had been controversial in the courts of appeals, it was due to it being applied in
different factual situations. Iowa referred to one of these situations as
“hypothetical independent source.”367 In cases of this type, courts must engage
in far reaching speculation as to whether the questioned evidence would have
been found through alternative legal methods. This was because at the time
the evidence was discovered no alternative legal method of discovering the
evidence was being pursued. As a result, a court would be forced to guess as
to how law enforcement officials would have behaved if the evidence was not
found illegally. Often, as in cases involving standard operating procedures,
such as checking a driver’s license, the guess would not be too speculative, but
other situations would result in much more speculation.368
An even more controversial application of the inevitable discovery
exception resulted in cases labeled “dependent inevitable discovery.”369 In
such cases, there is no actual or hypothetical lawful means of discovery being
pursued at the time of the legal violation. In these cases, application of the
inevitable discovery exception is an effort to salvage unlawful conduct as an
afterthought. An example provided in the brief was allowing evidence gathered
through a warrantless search because the government had the probable cause
necessary to obtain a warrant, but it never attempted to do so.370 Iowa warned
that if the exclusionary rule was ignored in such cases, the need to get warrants
prior to searches would be virtually erased and the State did not support
application of the inevitable discovery exception under these circumstances.371
Because the facts of this particular case provided an example of
“independent inevitable discovery,” Iowa argued that the Court should
overrule the Eighth Circuit. Iowa also argued that the exception should not
include a good faith requirement.372 Even if the Court were to accept the
inevitable discovery exception with a good faith requirement, Iowa believed
that Detective Leaming’s actions did not violate this principle. Iowa stated that

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Brief of the Petitioner, supra note 364, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
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the record supported its position that Detective Leaming had not acted in bad
faith in trying to elicit information from Williams.373
In an amicus brief filed by the United States, the Solicitor General’s office
presented a different view of the appropriate parameters of the inevitable
discovery exception. The United States argued that the inevitable discovery
exception should be adopted by the Court as a logical extension of both the
independent source and attenuation exceptions to the exclusionary rule.374
Despite its stated desire to limit judicial speculation regarding whether
evidence would be admissible, the U.S. position would allow considerably
more latitude for evidence to be admitted under the exception than Iowa’s.
The reason was that Iowa argued only for admission of evidence when the
factual record could demonstrate that police already had in place a line of
lawful investigation that would have led to discovery of the questioned
evidence. The U.S. position, on the other hand, would allow admission of
evidence under that circumstance, and when predictable investigative practices
would have led to discovery even when the police had not initiated it at the
time of the violation.375 This position would also allow admission when a
private individual provided the information necessary to lead police to the
evidence.376 The United States also argued that just as there was no linkage
been good faith and admission of evidence in the independent source or
attenuation exceptions there should not be one in the inevitable discovery
exception.377
As a result of the briefs submitted by Iowa and the United States, the
Supreme Court had been made aware that there were a variety of approaches to
inevitable discovery which, if desired, it could endorse. The majority opinion
in Nix v. Williams was written by Chief Justice Warren Burger and joined by
Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, and
Sandra Day O’Connor. It started with a review of the facts of the case and its
history.378 Before examining the constitutional soundness of the inevitable
discovery exception, Chief Justice Burger noted that “the ‘vast majority’ of all
courts, both state and federal” recognized the exception.379 Chief Justice
Burger then discussed the heart of the case, the role of the exclusionary rule in
the American legal system.380 The Court’s review of the history of the
exclusionary rule found that its only function was to deter future police
373. Id. at 23–32.
374. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 11–14, Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431 (1984) (No. 82-1651) [hereinafter Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae].
375. Id. at 15.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 19.
378. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 434–40 (1984).
379. Id. at 440.
380. Id. at 440–48.
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violations of constitutionally protected rights. While this interpretation of the
reasons behind the exclusionary rule demonstrates a selective reading of its
entire history, it was consistent with how the Burger Court had interpreted the
rule. Thus, in its reading of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States381 the
lesson to be learned was not that derivative evidence would also be excluded
from trial when its discovery was the result of illegal behavior. Instead, the
point which the Court emphasized from Silverthorne was that such information
did not become “sacred and inaccessible” due to the independent source
exception.382 Wong Sun v. United States383 provided a similar lesson about the
attenuation exception which explained that illegally seized evidence did not
have to be suppressed if it “has [also] been come at by . . . means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”384
The central point in the majority opinion’s reading of the history of the
exclusionary rule was that our judicial system has accepted the exclusionary
rule due to its deterrent effect despite its high social cost of, at times, letting the
guilty go free.385 Despite these costs, exclusion is necessary because the
“prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if
no illegality had transpired.”386 An examination of the way that derivative
evidence had been treated by the Court revealed, however, “that the
prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police
error or misconduct.387 As a result, even though there was a difference
between the independent source and inevitable discovery exceptions to the
exclusionary rule the Court believed there was “a functional similarity between
these two doctrines in that exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have
been discovered would also put the government in a worse position, because
the police would have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had taken
place.”388 After an examination of the history of the exclusionary rule, the
Court found the inevitable discovery exception to be compatible with the
Constitution.389
Having accepted the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule into our body of law, the Court set some standards for its application. In
doing so, the Court stated that tainted evidence would be admissible if the
prosecution could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Nix, 467 U.S. at 441 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392).
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Nix, 467 U.S at 442 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487).
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 444.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
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information would have been found inevitably by lawful means.390 When such
a situation exists, “then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the
evidence should be received.”391 The Court also held that in meeting its
burden the prosecution did not have to show that the police acted in good
faith.392 This was because such a showing would place courts in the position
of withholding truthful evidence from juries which would place the “police in a
worse position than they would have been if no unlawful conduct had
transpired.”393 This, the Court believed, would have placed too high of a
societal cost on our system of justice and its search for truth. Furthermore, the
Court believed that a showing of good faith on the part of police would not
affect future deterrence because “when an officer is aware that the evidence
will inevitably be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in any questionable
practice” to ensure the evidence’s admissibility.394
Overall, the Court believed that integrity and fairness required that
evidence which would inevitably have been discovered should be admitted at
trial even in the case of Sixth Amendment right to counsel violations. The
Court noted that the purpose of the right to counsel was to promote fairness
through the adversary process by allowing cross-examination to test the
reliability of evidence.395 Furthermore, the presence of counsel during the trip
from Davenport to Des Moines would have had no “bearing on the reliability
of the body as evidence.”396 Fairness is assured only when the State and
accused stand in the same position that they would be in had there been no
illegalities, and “when, as here, the evidence in question would inevitably have
been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no
nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.”397
In Nix, the Court was persuaded that the discovery of the body of Pamela
Powers and related physical evidence was inevitable. This was largely due to
the testimony at the suppression hearing of Agent Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau
of Criminal Investigation who organized a search party of around 200
volunteers and testified that had Williams not led the police to the body the
search would have been resumed and discovered the body in an additional
three to five hours. The Court therefore believed that it was clear that the body
and additional evidence would have inevitably been discovered by lawful
means and overturned the Eighth Circuit.398
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
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398.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 445.
Id.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 445–46.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 446–47.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 449–50.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

NIX v. WILLIAMS AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION

439

Justice William Brennan wrote a short dissenting opinion in which he was
joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Brennan noted that he agreed
that due to the similarities between the independent source and inevitable
discovery exceptions that he thought the inevitable discovery exception was
supported by the Constitution.399 He believed, however, that in its efforts to
weaken the exclusionary rule the Court had lost sight of one crucial difference
between the two exceptions. That difference being evidence found through the
inevitable discovery exception was only hypothetically found through
alternative legal methods. Due to this difference he believed that the Court
should raise the burden of proof in inevitable discovery cases from a
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence.400
IV. A LEGAL SAFETY NET
While the Court embraced the inevitable discovery exception in Nix and
made it clear that the burden of proof was a preponderance of the evidence and
that there was no good faith requirement, it failed to explain what form of the
exception it was adopting. Failure to do so may seem surprising given the
broad discussion of this issue in the briefs put forward by Iowa and the United
States.401 The Court gave no real indication as to whether it believed that only
instances of what Iowa had called in its brief “independent inevitable
discovery” should be allowed or whether it would accept a broader application
such as the United States had urged in its brief. The unwillingness of the Court
to clearly explain what form of inevitable discovery it was adopting left the
lower courts in a position in which they reserved for themselves the right to fill
in the details. This is illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit which wrote that Nix
was “silent as to what constitutes ‘inevitable’ discovery under the doctrine.”402
The inability of the Court to clarify exactly what the inevitable discovery
exception would entail has created problems for its uniform application
throughout the federal system.
Within a year of the decision, Nix v. Williams had received mixed reviews
from legal commentators.403 In the twenty-five years since the Nix decision

399. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
400. Id.
401. See supra notes 224–237.
402. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984). See also United States
v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985).
403. In the wake of Nix there were a number of observations made by legal commentators.
Some expressed support for the inevitable discovery exception, but believed that it would cause
erosion in the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. See Appel, supra note 363, at 101; James
Andrew Fishkin, Comment, Nix v. Williams: An Analysis of the Preponderance Standard for the
Inevitable Discovery Exception, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1369 (1985). Others believed that it placed the
courts in the position of facilitating violations of the law. See Leslie-Ann Marshall & Shelby
Webb, Jr., Case Note, Constitutional Law—The Burger Court’s Warm Embrace of an
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there has been a series of complaints made regarding the inevitable discovery
exception. These complaints have ranged from its utilization to avoid the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,404 its discouragement of
improvements in law enforcement training,405 its invitation for future abuse of
constitutional rights,406 its use in treating both primary and derivative evidence
the same,407 and its creation of a “chaotic state of affairs” resulting in different
application of the exception in different circuits.408 More recently,
commentators have focused on whether there is a need for an active pursuit of
an alternative legal method of discovery409 and whether the exception applies
to evidence which was illegally gathered from a third party.410 While
examining a variety of different problems which involve the inevitable
discovery exception, many articles use a similar formula. First, they identify a
problem in the application of the exception. Next, they present a wellreasoned solution to the problem. Finally, they end with a call to action on the
part of the Supreme Court to clarify the inevitable discovery exception’s
application.411
Despite these well-intentioned and sincere pleas for the Court to provide
clarity in this area of law, the Court is silent. What is missing from most of
these analyses despite a clear pattern of behavior is a sense of reality
concerning the Court’s view of the exclusionary rule and its social costs.
Simply put, the Court dislikes the rule because of what it sees as its high social
costs. These costs include interfering in the truth finding function of trials,
creating disrespect for the law, and, most importantly, possibly causing the
release of individuals who have committed crimes.412 The Court’s dislike of
the exclusionary rule is not a new revelation and has been a consistency in a

Impermissibly Designed Interference with the Sixth Amendment Right to the Assistance of
Counsel—The Adoption of the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Nix v.
Williams, 28 HOW. L.J. 945 (1985).
404. Robert M. Bloom, Inevitable Discovery: An Exception Beyond the Fruits, 20 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 79, 81 (1992).
405. John E. Fennelly, Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception: The Need for a
Good Faith Requirement, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1085, 1190 (1991).
406. Steven P. Grossman, The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for Reasonable
Limitations, 92 DICK. L. REV. 313, 314 (1988).
407. Forbes, supra note 4, at 1221.
408. Lamberth, supra note 4, at 137–38.
409. Eugene L. Shapiro, Active Pursuit, Inevitable Discovery, and the Federal Circuits: The
Search for Manageable Limitations Upon an Expansive Doctrine, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 295, 296
(2006); Hessler, supra note 4, at 244.
410. Julie M. Giddings, Note, The Interaction of the Standing and Inevitable Discovery
Doctrines of the Exclusionary Rule: Use of Evidence Illegally Obtained from the Defendant and a
Third Party, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1063 (2006).
411. See generally, e.g., Hessler, supra note 4.
412. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 (1984).
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string of cases beginning with Calandra v. United States and continuing
today.413 Throughout the Calandra era, scholars have noted the Court’s
discomfort with the exclusionary rule.414
In trying to determine why the Court has not provided clarity as to the
proper application of the inevitable discovery exception, it may be time to stop
being so logical and be realists. When it comes to explaining the Court’s
unwillingness to reexamine the parameters of the inevitable discovery doctrine,
most of the legal scholarship has missed the mark by trying to influence the
Court to act through persuasive legal arguments. The reality is that this is an
area where the Court is predisposed not to provide clarity. What was true
twenty-five years ago when Nix was decided remains true today. The majority
of the Court had a dislike of the exclusionary rule in 1984 and still does today.
As a result, the Court continues to take moves to avoid applying it.415 The
1984 Term which gave rise to the inevitable discovery and the good faith
exceptions to the exclusionary rule cannot be seen as an isolated event

413. The Court in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), re-examined the
exclusionary rule and found that rather than having a constitutional basis rooted in the Fourth or
other amendments, it was a judicially created remedy for the sole purpose of deterring the
government from violating the Constitution. In all of the following cases the Court ruled that
under the circumstances involved the use of the exclusionary rule was inappropriate. For
example, in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court held that even though the
defendant’s statements were inadmissible due to violations of the rights against self-incrimination
and to counsel, evidence which was discovered as a result of the statements was admissible. In
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), the Court stated that when a search was conducted pursuant
to a statute which was later found unconstitutional, any evidence gained through the search was
admissible. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Court held that evidence which
was illegally obtained by state police was admissible in a federal civil tax proceeding because the
police had acted in good faith when they obtained the evidence. Also, in 1976, the Court ruled in
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), that in habeas corpus proceedings, Fourth Amendment
claims, including claims that the exclusionary rule was not properly applied, would no longer be
reviewed. In 1980, the Court ruled in United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980), that illegally
gained evidence which is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief can be used to impeach
the defendant at a criminal trial. In all of the above cases the Court found that the application of
the exclusionary rule would contribute too little in the way of an added future deterrent in relation
to its cost of freeing the guilty.
414. Robert M. Bloom, The Supreme Court and its Purported Preference for Search
Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REV. 231, 239–40 (1983); Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the
Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273, 285 (1989); John D.
Castiglione, Hudson and Samson: The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity, and the Fourth
Amendment, 68 LA. L. REV. 63, 105–06 (2007); Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in
the Age of Hudson v. Michigan: Some Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort”, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1042–55 (2008); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth
Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 259 (1984).
415. A recent example is Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), where the Court ruled
that the exclusionary rule did not apply to violations of the knock and announce rule when police
have a valid warrant.
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regarding the Court’s attitude toward the exclusionary rule.416 Instead, it must
be examined as one year in a long term assault on the exclusionary rule. In a
series of cases running from Calandra through Hudson v. Michigan, the Court
has made it clear that it dislikes the exclusionary rule and will seize
opportunities to limit its use.
It is helpful to remember that Nix v. Williams was preceded by Brewer v.
Williams. Every member of the Court was bothered by the result in Brewer
and feared that the decision of the Court had the potential to cause the release
of Robert Anthony Williams, who the Court was convinced had committed a
heinous crime. It did not matter if the justice was in the majority or the
dissent, they all believed the facts to clearly be against Williams and that the
evidence pointed to his guilt. Justice Stewart called Williams’s crime
“senseless and brutal,” but thought that the constitutional violation was too
blatant to ignore.417 Justice Marshall, despite seeing a clear violation of the
law, called Williams a “dangerous criminal.”418 Justice Stevens also made
note of Williams’s probable guilt.419 Chief Justice Burger’s statement that
“Williams is guilty of the savage murder of a small child; no member of the
Court contends he is not . . .” was unchallenged by the other members of the
Court.420 Justice White added that Williams was “[a] mentally disturbed killer
whose guilt was not in question.”421 Finally, Justice Blackmun added that,
“The evidence of Williams’s guilt is overwhelming.”422 This frustration over
what the majority saw as a clear violation of Williams’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and the prospect that he may eventually be released helps to
explain why Justice Stewart’s opinion suggested that Iowa proceed with the
case against Robert Williams and make use of the inevitable discovery
exception.423 Despite Chief Justice Burger discounting the likelihood of a
successful retrial of Williams calling inevitable discovery an “unlikely
theory,”424 Judge Denato noted the encouragement Justice Stewart had given
the State to proceed in its second trial when he ruled that the body of Pamela
Powers and the tests run on it could be used as evidence.425 When given the
opportunity to weaken the exclusionary rule through adoption of what he had

416. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (providing constitutional support for the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
417. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977).
418. Id. at 408 (Marshall, J., concurring).
419. Id. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring).
420. Id. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 437 (White, J., dissenting).
422. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
423. Id. at 406 n.2.
424. Id. at 416 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
425. Joint Appendix, supra note 156, at 83–84.
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called the unlikely theory of the inevitable discovery exception, Chief Justice
Burger jumped at the chance.
When Nix came to the Court, Justice Stewart had been replaced by Justice
O’Connor, but all the other justices were there when Brewer was decided. For
these justices the only real questions they were prepared to answer were if the
inevitable discovery exception could be supported by the Constitution and if
the body of Pamela Powers would have been found by legal methods. No
other questions had to be answered because the real attractiveness of the
inevitable discovery exception to members of the Court since its inception in
Nix has been its flexibility to fit a wide variety of changing scenarios. This
flexibility creates a legal safety net by which evidence that was gathered
through a legal violation can still be used at trial thus avoiding the social costs
which the Court continues to believe are too high. This legal safety net allows
people who commit crimes to more successfully be prosecuted. That, after all,
was the real purpose behind the Burger Court’s exclusionary rule cases. Chief
Justice Burger’s opinion in Nix put it about as bluntly as he could when he
stated: “The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to block setting aside
convictions that would have been obtained without misconduct.”426
The desire for a flexible safety net is illustrated by the Court ignoring the
issue as to whether hypothetically discovered evidence needed to be in the
same condition as when it was actually found. At no place in its ruling in Nix
did the Court make mention of a need for the body to have been inevitably
found in the same condition as it was actually found. Following the lead of
Judge Denato that the freezing temperatures would have preserved the body
and other evidence, every court which had ruled in favor of allowing the
disputed evidence had ruled that it would have been found in essentially the
same condition. The Court was repeatedly made aware of this fact in the
record and Chief Justice Burger mentioned in his majority opinion that the trial
court, the Iowa Supreme Court, and the district court on habeas, had all ruled
that the body would have been legally found in essentially the same condition
had the constitutional violation not occurred.427
The problem with an honest reliance on this finding was that Iowa had
argued just the opposite at trial. To be fair, it is true that the defense also
changed its position regarding the impact that freezing temperatures had on the
preservation of evidence at trial. The change in positions did not play an
important role in the appellate process, but the Court was made aware of it.
The Respondent’s Brief made mention of both positions the State took
regarding freezing temperatures and destruction of evidence when it discussed
the failure of defense attorneys to call Richard Boucher as a witness at trial.
Richard Boucher had claimed that he heard Albert Bowers’s voice and
426. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 n.4 (1984).
427. Id. at 438–39.
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suspicious noises coming from Bowers’s room in the Y.M.C.A. at the time of
the crime and later found a bloody towel in the room after Bowers had fled.
The Respondent’s Brief noted:
Incredibly, the Boucher testimony was not offered at trial. . . . Bowers’
apparent nonsterility does not affect the relevance of the Boucher testimony.
Of course, if the jury concluded that the perpetrator was sterile, the Boucher
testimony would have been of relatively little value—but then the respondent
could not have been found guilty. On the other hand, if the jury accepted the
prosecution’s position at trial that the absence of sperm in the semen found on
the body was explainable by the annihilation of the sperm by the effects of
freezing temperatures—even though the position was inconsistent with its
position at the motion to suppress (App. 58–74)—the Boucher testimony
428
would have been powerfully supportive of the respondent’s defense.

The Court’s unwillingness to address whether the inevitable discovery
exception requires evidence to be in the same condition at the point of its
hypothetical finding versus when it was actually illegally found demonstrates
that the Court either misunderstood the complexities of the case or ignored
them for the purpose of creating a more flexible safety net which could be used
to gain convictions rather than having to apply the exclusionary rule. Because
this decision fits a larger pattern of behavior it is more likely that the Court’s
intent was to create a flexible safety net that could allow more evidence to be
used at trial.
Another example of the Court’s eagerness to adopt the inevitable discovery
exception and create a legal safety net is that the Court failed to explain
whether there must be an active alternative method in place that would have
lawfully led to discovery of evidence at the time of the illegality. Every court
that ruled on the issue in the Williams case had found that there was an active
lawful method of finding the body, the search party. A close examination of
the record reveals, however, that the search party had completed its planned for
search of Powesheik and Jasper Counties by 3:00 p.m. and had stopped at the
Jasper-Polk County line. At that time, the search was suspended. The body
was not located in Polk County until 5:30 p.m. It is true that Agent Ruxlow
testified at the suppression hearing that he would have reassembled the search
party and continued the search into the Polk County if necessary,429 but it is
also true that he knew the reason behind his testimony was to help convince
Judge Denato that the body would have been found through legal methods.430
Perhaps the knowledge that at the time that Williams actually led the police to
the body there was no active lawful alternative in place caused the Court to
couch its finding in terms which did not necessarily require an active

428. Brief of the Respondent, supra note 207, at 42 n.33.
429. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 41.
430. Brief of the Respondent, supra note 207, at 27 n.14.
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alternative to be in place in that time of the constitutional violation. As Chief
Justice Burger put it, “we are satisfied . . . that the volunteer search teams
would have resumed the search had Williams not earlier led the police to the
body and the body inevitably would have been found.”431 By not specifically
stating whether it was a necessity for an alternative method to be active at the
time of the constitutional infraction, the Court created flexibility in the
application of the inevitable discovery exception which would make it easier in
future cases to allow use of the exception to gain convictions.
If the legal safety net created by the inevitable discovery exception helps to
ensure that the guilty will be removed from the streets and punished, the Court
seems little bothered by the government’s violations of the law. Its decision
not to require a good faith element in the inevitable discovery exception tells
trial courts not to examine the facts behind the constitutional infraction. In the
Court’s view, the violation of the Constitution is not what is important. The
important thing it is limiting the costs placed on society by the exclusionary
rule and boosting the government’s ability to gain a conviction. The same
thing can be said by the Court’s silence as to whether the exception applies to
primary or derivative evidence. To the Court it does not matter whether the
evidence is primary or derivative, it is the ability to use the illegally gained
evidence that matters. In regards to the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule, it is time for legal scholars to look beyond the need for
consistency in legal doctrine and give attention to the consistency of result. An
examination which focuses on result, rather than reasoning helps to explain
why, despite a number of opportunities, the Court has repeatedly decided not
to clarify the exception.432 The Court has preferred to leave the inevitable

431. Nix, 467 U.S. at 449–50 (emphasis added).
432. The Court has denied certiorari in the following types of cases which would have
allowed it to review when it is appropriate to apply the inevitable discovery exception: (1) the
admission of primary evidence versus derivative evidence (see, e.g., United States v. Arango, 879
F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990)); United States v. Satterfield, 743
F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d
293 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984); (2) the need for an ongoing investigation
(see, e.g., United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1140
(1998); United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1006 (1988)); (3) warrant requirements (see, e.g., United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986)); and (4) the appropriateness of using routine
police procedures to facilitate inevitable discovery (see, e.g., United States v. Toledo, 139 F.3d
913, (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 932 (1998); United States v. Gravens, 129 F.3d 974
(7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1035 (1998)). Only once since Nix has the inevitable
discovery exception been properly before the Court. The Court was directly asked by the
petitioner in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), “Does the inevitable discovery doctrine
create a per se exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized and a Fourth Amendment
‘knock and announce’ violation?” Brief for the Petitioner at i, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586
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discovery exception flexible so that it can continue to serve as a legal safety
net to ensure that people who seem factually guilty are convicted. We should
expect no changes in this approach until such time that we see changes in the
personnel on the Court who believe that the government’s adherence to the law
is as important as the adherence of its citizens to the laws.

(2006) (No. 04-1360). Rather than using the inevitable discovery exception to resolve the issue,
the Court created a new exception to the exclusionary rule.

